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Abstract: Here, I examine the epistemic relation between beliefs about the nature 
of sexual orientation (e.g. beliefs concerning whether orientation is dispositional) 
and beliefs about the taxonomy of orientation categories (e.g. beliefs concerning 
whether polyamorous is an orientation category). Current philosophical research 
gives epistemic priority to the former class of beliefs, such that beliefs about the 
taxonomy of orientation categories tend to be jettisoned or revised in cases of 
conflict with beliefs about the nature of sexual orientation. Yet, considering the 
influence of ideology on beliefs about socially significant phenomena, I argue for 
an epistemic reversal.
Keywords: Sexual Orientation; Ideology; Methodology.
What is sexual orientation? This important question about the nature of sexual 
orientation has been of central interest to philosophers working on the social 
ontology of sexuality. We are also interested in the taxonomy of sexual orienta-
tion categories. What are the sexual orientation categories? Perhaps the socially 
dominant taxonomy is correct. Or, maybe we ought to endorse an alternative 
taxonomy.
In the social ontology of sexuality, beliefs about the nature of sexual orien-
tation are generally given epistemic priority in relation to beliefs about the tax-
onomy of orientation categories. I refer to this treatment of the epistemic relation 
between beliefs about the nature of sexual orientation and beliefs about the tax-
onomy of orientation categories as the orientation-first view. In this paper, I argue 
that we ought to reject the orientation-first view in favor of the taxonomy-first 
view, which gives beliefs about the taxonomy of orientation categories epistemic 
priority in relation to beliefs about the nature of sexual orientation. In effect, I 
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aim to reverse the epistemic order of a recently sprouted sub-field of philosophi-
cal inquiry.
My argument for the taxonomy-first view proceeds as follows. In the first 
section, I explicate the distinction between the orientation-first and taxonomy-
first views. In the second section, I provide a dialectical reason to endorse the tax-
onomy-first view. In particular, I discuss a recent debate between Robin Dembroff 
and Esa Díaz-León about the nature of sexual orientation (Dembroff 2016; Díaz-
León forthcoming). And I argue that while Dembroff and Díaz-León’s endorse-
ment of the orientation-first view generates an impasse, the taxonomy-first view 
allows the dialectic to move forward. In the third section, I provide an independ-
ent argument for the taxonomy-first view by considering the influence of ideology 
on beliefs related to the nature and taxonomy of social properties.
1   The Orientation-First vs. Taxonomy-First Views 
of Sexual Orientation
In this section, I will explicate the orientation-first and taxonomy-first views of 
sexual orientation by distinguishing orientation facts from orientation taxonomy 
facts (Section 1.1), before describing how each view understands the epistemic 
relation between these two types of facts (Section 1.2). And I will note that the 
orientation-first view is endorsed in recent work on the metaphysics of sexual 
orientation (Section 1.3).
1.1   Orientation Facts and Orientation Taxonomy Facts
Orientation facts are facts about the nature of sexual orientation. With Díaz-León, 
let us suppose that sexual orientation is a property (Díaz-León forthcoming). The 
property of sexual orientation is instantiated in many persons, but it is not instan-
tiated in sedimentary rocks, ferns, or prime numbers. Now, what is the nature of 
the property of sexual orientation? Answering this question will yield the orienta-
tion facts.
For example, if either Dembroff or Díaz-León’s theory of sexual orientation is 
correct, it is an orientation fact that orientation is a dispositional property. As I 
will discuss below, if Díaz-León’s analysis is correct, it is an orientation fact that 
individuals instantiate the property of sexual orientation in virtue of being dis-
posed to have certain sexual desires (Díaz-León forthcoming). In contrast, if Dem-
broff’s analysis is correct, it is an orientation fact that individuals instantiate the 
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property of sexual orientation in virtue of being disposed to engage in particular 
sexual behaviors (Dembroff 2016, p. 18).
In order to gain additional traction on the concept of orientation facts, let 
us consider facts about the nature of race.1 Many persons have a race, unlike 
metamorphic rocks, seaweed, and composite numbers. Here, I will highlight two 
competing theories about the nature of race. On Quayshawn Spencer’s view, indi-
viduals have a race in virtue of being a member of a “human population parti-
tion,” i.e. a genetically significant division in the species homo sapiens (Spencer 
2014, p. 1029–1032). In contrast, Sally Haslanger holds that individuals have a 
race in virtue of occupying a particular type of social position, more specifically: 
in virtue of being socially subordinated or privileged on the basis of perceived 
geographical ancestry.2
In contrast to orientation facts, orientation taxonomy facts include facts about 
what categories are orientation categories. For example, it is a fact about the tax-
onomy of orientation categories that woman is not an orientation category. My 
enduring admiration notwithstanding, I will even hazard to claim that there is no 
orientation category that corresponds to being exclusively attracted to Madonna. 
As will become important below, Díaz-León holds that homosexual, heterosexual, 
and bisexual are orientation categories, while Dembroff endorses a revisionary 
taxonomy that includes categories such as woman-oriented and female-oriented.
Here, it will be useful to continue the analogy with race. In addition to facts 
about the nature of race, there are facts about the taxonomy of race categories.3 
It is evident that lawyer and U.S. Citizen are not race categories. So, what are the 
race categories? Haslanger holds that taxonomies of race categories vary across 
social milieus (Haslanger 2012b, p. 308). For example, on Haslanger’s view, 
the taxonomy of race categories in early twentieth-century London is distinct 
from the mid-century taxonomy in Germany. Haslanger holds that, in the con-
temporary US, the taxonomy includes (at least) the categories of White, Black, 
Asian, and Latinx (Haslanger 2012b, p. 306). In contrast, Spencer holds that the 
taxonomy of race categories has remained constant across recent evolutionary 
1 Facts about the nature of race and sexual orientation belong to a broader class of facts, viz., 
analysis facts. That is, orientation facts are analysis facts about sexual orientation. And facts 
about the nature of race are analysis facts regarding race. I note this commonality on account of 
analogies to be drawn between facts related to race and sexual orientation.
2 See esp. Haslanger (2012a) and Haslanger (2012b).
3 Note that facts about the taxonomies of orientation and race categories belong to yet another 
broader class of facts, viz., taxonomy facts. Taxonomy facts about sexual orientation are orienta-
tion taxonomy facts. And taxonomy facts about race are race taxonomy facts. (For ease of expres-
sion, I will often simply use the phrase “taxonomy fact” and allow context to indicate whether 
the taxonomy fact under discussion relates specifically to sexual orientation or race.)
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history, and the taxonomy exhaustively includes the following categories: 
African, Caucasian, East Asian, American Indian, and Oceanian (Spencer 2014, 
p. 1030). Note that Spencer’s categories are (more than lexically) distinct from 
Haslanger’s categories. For example, Spencer categorizes Middle Eastern and 
South Asian individuals as Caucasian. But for Haslanger, the category White 
does not (at least straightforwardly) include Middle Eastern and South Asian 
individuals.
1.2   The Epistemic Relation Between Orientation Facts and 
Orientation Taxonomy Facts
The orientation-first and taxonomy-first views are distinguished by their answers 
to the following question: what is the epistemic relation between orientation 
facts and orientation taxonomy facts? The orientation-first view holds that beliefs 
about the nature of sexual orientation have epistemic priority relative to beliefs 
about the taxonomy of orientation categories. And the taxonomy-first view holds 
the reverse.
In order to cash out the notion of epistemic priority, suppose that, at T1, I 
believed that Doggo is a dog, and I also believed that it is metaphysically impossi-
ble to have a non-veridical perceptual experience. At T2, I had a perceptual expe-
rience in which Doggo’s ear was damaged, revealing part of a computer chip and 
some sleek mechanisms, and I formed the belief that I perceived (veridically or 
otherwise) that Doggo is composed of robot parts. For the purpose of example, 
let us hold fixed this belief about my perceiving Doggo to be composed of robot 
parts, and suppose that – given this belief – there is a conflict between the belief 
that Doggo is a dog and the belief that it is metaphysically impossible to have a 
non-veridical perceptual experience.
At T3, what ought I to believe? Perhaps I ought to retain the belief that Doggo 
is a dog and revise the belief that it is metaphysically impossible to have a non-
veridical perceptual experience (such that, e.g. I come to believe that it is merely 
unlikely that any given perceptual experience is non-veridical). Alternatively, 
perhaps I ought to jettison or revise the belief that Doggo is a dog. I would not 
rule on what the norms of belief require in this case. If the belief that Doggo is a 
dog has epistemic priority in relation to the belief that it is impossible to have a 
non-veridical perceptual experience, then I ought to retain the former belief and 
jettison or revise the latter. And the reverse holds if the latter belief has epistemic 
priority in relation to the former. Or, perhaps both beliefs ought to be revised, in 
which case neither has epistemic priority in relation to the other. The point of this 
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toy (poodle) example can be expressed as follows: belief B has epistemic priority 
in relation to belief B1 if and only if, in the case of conflict, belief B ought to be 
retained and belief B1 ought to be jettisoned or revised.
However, as will become evident below, the taxonomy-first view concerns 
the epistemic priority of beliefs of a certain class in relation to beliefs of another 
class. We might capture this with a modification to the above formulation: beliefs 
that are members of class C have epistemic priority in relation to beliefs that are 
members of class C1 if and only if, in the case of conflict, the class C belief ought 
to be retained and the class C1 belief ought to be jettisoned or revised. Yet, that 
formulation will be unduly strict for the purpose of explicating the taxonomy-first 
view of sexual orientation. Instead, what is important is a generic generalization: 
class C beliefs have epistemic priority in relation to class C1 beliefs just in case, as 
a matter of generic generalization, in the case of conflict, class C beliefs ought to 
be retained and class C1 beliefs ought to be jettisoned or revised. For example, it is 
plausible that an agent’s beliefs about their occurrent mental states have this sort 
of epistemic priority in relation to their beliefs about the external world. Here, as 
a matter of generic generalization, an agent’s beliefs about their occurrent mental 
states ought to be retained in the case of conflict with beliefs about the external 
world.
Notably, the above formulation of epistemic priority appeals quite broadly 
to norms of belief, that is, norms about what an agent ought to believe. This 
gloss is in the interest of neutrality. Here, I do not aim to assess whether the 
norms of belief are explained by a universally-demanding norm of rationality; 
there is a tradition in feminist epistemology critiquing the idea.4 Neither do I 
aim to assess whether the norms of belief are purely epistemic; in addition to 
evidential reasons, there might be moral reasons to retain, revise, or jettison 
beliefs.5 Instead of searching precisely for what the norms of belief involve, 
what matters in the context of this paper is finding what they demand. (In case 
that seems impracticable, note an analogy to the moral case. Even without com-
plete knowledge of the correct moral theory, it is plausible that agents can know 
whether an action is right or wrong.)
To further clarify the distinction between the orientation-first and taxon-
omy-first views, it will be useful to continue the analogy with race. As noted 
above, Haslanger and Spencer endorse significantly different theories about 
the nature of race and the taxonomy of race categories. Importantly, Haslanger 
4 See esp. Haraway (1988). In case it seems that I have taken the theoretical virtue of neutrality 
too far, note that Haraway (1988) strongly rejects epistemic relativism.
5 See esp. Basu (2019).
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and Spencer also have significantly different views about the epistemic relation 
between beliefs about the nature of race and beliefs about the taxonomy of race 
categories.
Haslanger’s analysis of race relies on the belief that the taxonomy of race 
categories in the contemporary US includes the categories of Black, White, Asian, 
and Latinx. On this point, she claims:
We can all confidently identify members of different races. Martin Luther King, Nelson 
Mandela, Malcolm X, Toni Morrison, Oprah Winfrey, W. E. B. DuBois, Kofi Annan, Thabo 
Mbeki (insert here your choice of various friends and relatives) are Black. George Bush, 
Arnold Schwarzenegger, Margaret Thatcher, Golda Meir, Bertrand Russell, Vincent Van 
Gogh (insert here your choice of various friends and relatives) are White. Similar lists 
can be constructed for Asians, Latino/as, and other groups usually considered races. But 
if this is the case, then the terms “Black” and “White” pick out the best fitting and most 
unified objective type of which the members of the list are paradigms – even if I can not 
describe the type or my beliefs about what the paradigms have in common are false (Has-
langer 2012b, p. 306).
The idea that Black, White, Asian, and Latinx are race categories is bedrock in 
Haslanger’s analysis. From here, Haslanger’s task is to analyze the categories. 
Haslanger argues that – notwithstanding any appearance to the contrary – the 
categories Black, White, Asian, and Latinx do not correspond to natural kinds 
(Haslanger 2012b, p. 306–307).6 Instead, she argues that the race categories cor-
respond to certain social positions.
In the context of this paper, it is not important to dive into the details of Has-
langer’s social position analysis of race. Here, my point is that Haslanger gives 
beliefs about the taxonomy of race categories epistemic priority in relation to 
beliefs about the nature of race. For Haslanger, if an otherwise plausible theory of 
the nature of race has the result that Latinx is not a race category, that is reason 
to reject the theory of the nature of race – it is not reason to jettison the belief that 
Latinx is a race category.7
6 See also Haslanger (2012a) and Haslanger (2012c).
7 As Latinx might be interpreted as an ethnicity, perhaps this interpretation of Haslanger is too 
strong. In that case, here is a less controversial (although, more complex) statement of the point: 
for Haslanger, if an otherwise plausible theory of the nature of race has the result that Black is 
not a race category, that is reason to reject the theory of the nature of race – it is not reason to 
jettison the belief that Black is a race category. Notice, however, that Spencer denies that Black 
is a race category. Instead, for Spencer, African is a race category. This is not merely a linguistic 
difference. Black and African are different categories. On Haslanger’s taxonomy, Nelson Mandela 
and Barack Obama are both Black. In contrast, Spencer’s taxonomy plausibly has the result that 
Nelson Mandela is African, while Barack Obama is mixed race (African and Caucasian).
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In contrast, Spencer gives beliefs about the nature of race epistemic prior-
ity in relation to beliefs about the taxonomy of race categories. As noted above, 
Spencer holds that race is a feature of human population genetics. More precisely, 
Spencer holds that “race” refers to a set containing the five most genetically sig-
nificant human population partitions (Spencer 2014, p. 1026–1029). This theory of 
the nature of race is bedrock for Spencer.
With his genetic theory of race at hand, Spencer asks: what are the five most 
genetically significant human population partitions? Considering the empirical 
data, Spencer concludes that we ought to endorse “the Blumenbach partition,” 
which exhaustively includes the categories discussed in the previous sub-section: 
African, Caucasian, East Asian, American Indian, and Oceanian (Spencer 2014, p. 
1030).
Although Spencer is interested in correlations between the Blumenbach 
categories and our ordinary categories, he allows that there are significant dif-
ferences between the taxonomies. For example, Spencer notes that Latinx does 
not neatly correspond to any of the Blumenbach categories (Spencer 2014, 
p. 1033). Although Spencer does not say precisely how he handles this “mismatch” 
between the Blumenbach categories and our ordinary categories, he denies that 
Latinx is a race category.8
Here, my point is that Spencer gives beliefs about the nature of race epis-
temic priority in relation to beliefs about the taxonomy of race categories. For 
Spencer, if an otherwise plausible theory of the taxonomy of race categories 
leads to the result that race is not a feature of human population genetics, 
that is reason to reject the theory of the taxonomy of race categories – it is 
not reason to jettison the belief that race can be analyzed in terms of human 
population genetics.
By analogy with the epistemologies of Haslanger and Spencer’s theo-
ries of race, we can explicate the difference between the orientation-first and 
 taxonomy-first views of sexual orientation. The orientation-first view holds that, 
as a matter of generic generalization, in the case of conflict, beliefs about the 
nature of sexual orientation ought to be retained and beliefs about the taxonomy 
of orientation categories ought to be jettisoned or revised. In contrast, on the 
taxonomy-first view, as a matter of generic generalization, in the case of conflict, 
beliefs about the taxonomy of orientation categories ought to be retained and 
beliefs about the nature of sexual orientation ought to be jettisoned or revised. 
8 It seems that Spencer must hold that Latinx individuals are members of a single Blumenbach 
category or that Latinx individuals are “mixed race” (across Blumenbach categories). Spencer 
(2014) responds to an objection that holds that Blumenbach categories and ordinary categories 
are “mismatched.”
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Of course, that is all quite schematic.9 In order to flesh out this outline, we will 
need an example of inconsistent beliefs about the nature of sexual orientation 
and the taxonomy of orientation categories. (That is, we will need an example 
analogous to the following inconsistent beliefs about the nature of race and the 
taxonomy of race categories: race is a feature of human population genetics, 
and Latinx is a race category.) In section two, I will provide further traction on 
the orientation-first and taxonomy-first views by explicating how Dembroff and 
Díaz-León’s theories of the nature of sexual orientation are inconsistent with 
(different) beliefs about the taxonomy of orientation categories, before consid-
ering how the orientation-first and taxonomy-first views recommend handling 
these inconsistencies.
With the distinction between the orientation-first and taxonomy-first views 
of sexual orientation at hand, I move to consider Dembroff and Díaz-León’s treat-
ment of the epistemic relation between orientation facts and taxonomy facts.
1.3   Dembroff and Díaz-León’s Endorsement of the  
Orientation-First View
The work of Dembroff and Díaz-León is a touchstone in the social ontology of 
sexuality. Díaz-León seems to follow Dembroff’s stated methodology (Díaz-León 
forthcoming), which Dembroff describes as follows:
[This paper’s] target is twofold: (i) the everyday concept of sexual orientation, and (ii) 
the corresponding concepts associated with the taxonomy of sexual orientation (e.g. gay, 
straight). These concepts are highly interwoven, since the concept of sexual orientation 
constrains the taxonomy […] My project sets out to engineer a revised concept of sexual ori-
entation that implies a new taxonomical schema of sexual orientation (Dembroff 2016, p. 2).
Here, Dembroff holds that the analysis of sexual orientation constrains the analy-
sis of the taxonomy, but they do not mention the reverse. Additionally, Dembroff 
claims that the concept of sexual orientation “implies” a taxonomy of orientation 
categories (Dembroff 2016, p. 2, 4).
To clarify, the orientation-first view does not require remaining agnostic 
about the taxonomy of orientation categories until settling on a theory of the 
9 As a point of clarification, note that the distinction between the taxonomy-first view and the 
orientation-first view cuts across the distinction between methodological conservatism and 
methodological liberalism. That is because a methodology might be conservative/liberal with 
respect to beliefs about taxonomy facts and/or beliefs about orientation facts.
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nature of sexual orientation. Indeed, Díaz-León and Dembroff consider the merits 
of various taxonomies in developing their analyses of sexual orientation. Instead, 
what is important to the orientation-first view is the claim that beliefs about the 
nature of sexual orientation generally ought to be preferred in the case of conflict 
with beliefs about the taxonomy of orientation categories.
While I aim to have shown that Díaz-León and Dembroff endorse the orien-
tation-first view, my interpretation is open to the following complication. There 
is a difference between Díaz-León and Dembroff’s stated methodologies, on the 
one hand, and the methodological parameters under which their arguments 
proceed, on the other. And there is a worry that I have unduly highlighted the 
former. I deny that I have focused on Díaz-León and Dembroff’s stated method-
ologies at the expense of misinterpreting the methodologies that they actually 
employ. Yet, even if that were the case, it would still be an interesting result if 
Díaz-León and Dembroff had reason to endorse the taxonomy-first view, contra 
their stated methodologies. More importantly, as will become evident in the fol-
lowing sections, the question of whether we ought to endorse an orientation-first 
or taxonomy-first view of sexual orientation is of general significance to research 
on the social ontology of sexuality.
2   The Dialectical Consequences of the 
Orientation-First and Taxonomy-First Views
In this section, I outline a recent debate between Dembroff and Díaz-León about 
the nature of sexual orientation (Section 2.1), argue that Dembroff and Díaz-
León’s endorsement of the orientation-first view generates an impasse (Section 
2.2), and describe how the taxonomy-first view can resolve the impasse in the 
debate (Section 2.3). Additionally, I answer an objection to this argument for the 
taxonomy-first view (Section 2.4).
Here, note that the dialectical force of the taxonomy-first view provides 
reason to endorse it. This is the case for the following two reasons. First, although 
some dialectics close with an impasse, that would be a strange result at this point 
in the debate between Dembroff and Díaz-León. Social metaphysicians have just 
begun discussing the nature of sexual orientation. Moreover, Dembroff and Díaz-
León share a queer perspective on the topic of orientation. Accordingly, it seems 
unlikely that the debate would have already reached an irresolvable impasse. 
Second, I join Dembroff and Díaz-León’s ameliorative project, which aims to 
produce sexual orientation concepts that – if deployed in our milieu – would 
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have beneficial social and political effects.10 And the impasse between Dembroff 
and Díaz-León is an obstacle to our shared ameliorative aims. For these reasons, 
we should search for ways to advance the dialectic.
2.1   The Debate between Dembroff and Díaz-León
In their groundbreaking work on sexual orientation, Dembroff argues for the 
following analysis of sexual orientation, which they refer to as bidimensional 
dispositionalism:
A person S’s sexual orientation is grounded in S’s dispositions to engage in sexual behav-
iors under the ordinary condition[s] for these dispositions, and which sexual orientation S 
has is grounded in what sex[es] and gender[s] of persons S is disposed to sexually engage 
under these conditions (Dembroff 2016, p. 18).
Dembroff’s analysis holds that the property of sexual orientation is dispositional, 
behavior-based, relative to both sex and gender, and thinly-relational. In turn, I 
will work through these aspects of bidimensional dispositionalism. (Also, I aim 
for the discussion to highlight and clarify some of the theoretical choice points in 
the sub-field.)
First, let us distinguish between behavior-based and desire-based analy-
ses of orientation. Behavior-based views hold that individuals instantiate the 
property of sexual orientation in virtue of features of their sexual behaviors, 
not their desires. In contrast, desire-based views hold that individuals instan-
tiate the property of sexual orientation in virtue of features of their sexual 
desires, not their behaviors. Dembroff endorses a behavior-based analysis of 
orientation.
Second, we can distinguish between dispositional and categorical analyses 
of orientation.11 On categorical analyses, individuals instantiate the property 
of sexual orientation in virtue of their sexual desires or behaviors. In contrast, 
dispositional analyses hold that individuals instantiate the property of sexual 
orientation in virtue of their dispositions to sexual desires or behavior. We can 
10 For additional discussion of ameliorative projects in social ontology, see esp. Haslanger 
(2012d).
11 This distinction is sometimes glossed as a distinction between dispositional and behavioral 
analyses. However, because we also need to distinguish between desire-based and behavior-
based analyses, I find it useful to characterize the former distinction in terms of dispositional 
and categorical properties.
Sexual Orientation, Ideology, and Philosophical Method      215
combine desire-based and behavior-based views with either dispositional or 
categorical analyses.12 For example, Dembroff endorses a behavior-based dispo-
sitional analysis, holding that individuals instantiate the property of sexual ori-
entation in virtue of their dispositions to sexual behavior.
Third, analyses of sexual orientation must answer the following question: 
on the basis of attractions to which type(s) of features do individuals instanti-
ate the property of sexual orientation? For example, suppose that an individual 
is exclusively attracted to short female women. Does the individual instantiate 
the property of sexual orientation in virtue of their attractions to sex-features, 
 gender-features, and/or height-features? Dembroff argues that individuals instanti-
ate the property of sexual orientation in virtue of their attractions to sex-features 
and/or gender-features, but not other types of features.13
Fourth, analyses of orientation are either (what I will call) thickly-relational 
or thinly-relational. On thickly-relational analyses of orientation, individuals 
instantiate the property of sexual orientation in virtue of being attracted to 
individuals with particular sex-features, gender-features, or other features, and 
themselves having particular sex-features, gender-features, or other features. In 
contrast, thinly-relational analyses of orientation hold that individuals instan-
tiate the property of sexual orientation in virtue of being attracted to individu-
als with particular sex-features, gender-features, or other features, irrespective 
of their own sex, gender, etc. Dembroff endorses a thinly-relational analysis of 
orientation.
With Dembroff’s account at hand, I move to provide Díaz-León’s analysis of 
sexual orientation, as well as her argument against bidimensional disposition-
alism. Motivated by the idea that “we could understand sexual orientations in 
12 At this point, it is important to address the following complication: if we endorsed a dispo-
sitional analysis of sexual desire, categorical desire-based accounts of orientation would not 
deserve the label “categorical”. Unfortunately, alternative terminology faces similar compli-
cations. For example, we might instead distinguish between “first-order dispositional” and 
“second-order dispositional” analyses of orientation. However, that terminology does not ac-
curately describe categorical behavioral analyses of orientation. While it would be ideal to find 
terminology that speaks to all of the conceptual space, here I will distinguish between cat-
egorical and dispositional analyses. In part, I have made this terminological choice because, 
as I will discuss below, Díaz-León’s account of sexual desire does not admit of a dispositional 
analysis.
13 Accordingly, Dembroff distinguishes between sex and gender. Although many feminist phi-
losophers endorse the sex/gender distinction, its formulation is contested. So I will simply note 
that sex categories include intersex, female, and male. In contrast, gender categories include 
woman, man, and genderqueer (among others). See also Dembroff’s (2016) distinction between 
sexual orientation and “sexual druthers.”
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terms of sexual preferences” (Díaz-León forthcoming). Díaz-León develops the fol-
lowing analysis of orientation, which she refers to as the desire view:
A person S’s sexual orientation is determined by the sex[es] and/or the gender[s] of persons 
for whom S is disposed to have sexual desires, under the relevant manifesting conditions 
(and S’s own sex and/or gender) (Díaz-León forthcoming).
And Díaz-León provides the following analysis of sexual desire:
A sexual desire (for men and/or women) involves the combination of a propositional attitude 
(of the form “S bears the relation of desiring towards proposition p”) plus a disposition to be 
sexually aroused by, or sexually attracted to, men and/or women (Díaz-León forthcoming).
With Dembroff, Díaz-León endorses a dispositional analysis of sexual orientation. 
Also with Dembroff, Díaz-León holds that individuals instantiate the property of 
sexual orientation in virtue of being attracted to individuals with particular sex-
features and/or gender-features, but not other types of features. Contra Dembroff, 
Díaz-León’s analysis of orientation is thickly-relational and desire-based.
Note that on Díaz-León’s view, sexual desire is not (merely) a disposition to 
sexual behavior. This is the case because Díaz-León’s account of sexual desire 
includes a phenomenological element of arousal. For example, suppose that 
Simone desires to have sex with Dominique. For Díaz-León, this requires that 
Simone is disposed to experience sexual arousal related to Dominique. That is, 
Simone’s desire to have sex with Dominique includes a disposition to have a 
certain phenomenological experience. As phenomenological experiences such 
as arousal are not dispositions to behavior,14 Díaz-León would deny that sexual 
desires are (mere) dispositions to behavior.
I highlight the phenomenological element of Díaz-León’s account of desire 
in order to make sense of the substantivity of the disagreement between Dem-
broff and Díaz-León. If Díaz-León were to analyze sexual desires as dispositions 
to sexual behavior, then the disagreement between Dembroff and Díaz-León 
could be glossed as follows: while Dembroff holds that orientation is a matter 
of first-order dispositions to sexual behavior, Díaz-León holds that orientation 
is a matter of second-order dispositions to sexual behavior (that is, dispositions 
to dispositions to sexual behavior). In that case, there would not be much of a 
14 While mental states such as desires and beliefs are often analyzed as dispositions to behav-
iors, I take it to be fairly uncontroversial that phenomenological experiences do not admit of a 
similar treatment. Individuals can be identical with respect to behavioral dispositions, while dif-
fering with respect to phenomenological experience (even if this is not the case for other mental 
states, such as desires and beliefs).
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disagreement. However, as Díaz-León holds that sexual desire includes a phe-
nomenological element of sexual arousal, the deflationary gloss of the disagree-
ment between Dembroff and Díaz-León is not available.15
For the purposes of this paper, I will focus on Díaz-León’s critique of Dem-
broff’s bidimensional dispositionalist analysis of orientation. In particular, 
Díaz-León argues that – unlike the desire view – bidimensional dispositional-
ism cannot accurately ascribe heterosexuality and bisexuality to individuals, i.e. 
bidimensional dispositionalism cannot capture the membership conditions of 
categories such as heterosexual and bisexual.
Díaz-León begins her critique by considering Alicia, a female woman, who is 
sexually aroused by both women and men. Given this feature of Alicia’s sexuality, 
Díaz-León holds that Alicia is bisexual. Díaz-León constructs the case of Alicia such 
that in the actual world, as well as in nearby possible worlds, Alicia is disposed to 
have sex exclusively with men. However, Alicia is disposed to have sex with both 
women and men in distant possible worlds. (In nearby possible worlds, Alicia is 
in a monogamous relationship with a particular man.) In order to capture the fact 
that Alicia is bisexual, Díaz-León claims that bidimensional dispositionalism must 
hold that individuals instantiate the property of sexual orientation in virtue of their 
dispositions to behavior in both nearby and distant possible worlds.
Next, Díaz-León considers Cary, a male man, who is predominately – indeed, 
almost exclusively – sexually aroused by women. Given this feature of Cary’s 
sexuality, Díaz-León holds that Cary is heterosexual.16 Díaz-León imagines the 
case such that in the actual world, as well as in nearby possible worlds, Cary is 
disposed to engage in sexual activity exclusively with women. However, in some 
distant possible worlds, Cary is disposed to have sex with women and men. (In 
some distant possible worlds, Cary has a more experimental personality.) In order 
to capture the fact that Cary is heterosexual, Díaz-León claims that bidimensional 
dispositionalism must hold that individuals instantiate the property of sexual ori-
entation in virtue of their dispositions to behavior in nearby possible worlds, but 
not in distant possible worlds.
15 Díaz-León (forthcoming) denies that desires are dispositions to behavior. Still, note that it is 
not necessary to stake out a theory of desire in order to make sense of the substantivity of the 
debate between Dembroff and Díaz-León. Regardless of whether the concept of desire is apt to 
Díaz-León’s theory, what is important is that – contra Dembroff – Díaz-León holds that sexual 
orientation includes a phenomenological element of arousal. And phenomenological experi-
ences are not dispositions to behavior.
16 As will become evident below, Díaz-León’s critique of bidimensional dispositionalism relies 
on intuitions about Alicia and Cary’s sexual orientations. That said, Díaz-León (forthcoming) 
defends these intuitions, holding that the ascription of bisexuality to Alicia and heterosexuality 
to Cary is in accordance with the ordinary usage of the terms “bisexual” and “heterosexual”.
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With these cases at hand, Díaz-León presents the following critique of bidi-
mensional dispositionalism:
The main worry for bidimensional dispositionalism can be put in the form of a dilemma: 
If we understand the account loosely enough, then we can count possible worlds where 
Alicia is not monogamous and has sex with women as being relevant for determining some-
one’s sexual orientation, and then the account would rightly capture the intuition that she 
is bisexual. But if we take this approach, then there seems to be no way of ruling out pos-
sible worlds where Cary feels like experimenting and has sex with some men, so the account 
could not capture the intuition that Cary is heterosexual. On the other hand, if we under-
stand the relevant manifesting conditions more narrowly, and restrict the possible worlds 
to those where Cary does not feel like experimenting with men, then we should also restrict 
the possible worlds to those where Alicia is in a monogamous relationship with her male 
partner, but then Alicia would count as heterosexual, not bisexual. In conclusion, I do not 
see any way of modifying the account so that it can solve both counterexamples at the same 
time (Díaz-León forthcoming).
In short, there is no interpretation of bidimensional dispositionalism that 
ascribes bisexuality to Alicia and heterosexuality to Cary. For this reason, Díaz-
León argues that we ought to reject bidimensional dispositionalism.
2.2   The Orientation-First View Generates an Impasse between 
Dembroff and Díaz-León
I think that Díaz-León has demonstrated that bidimensional dispositionalism 
cannot capture the membership conditions of categories such as heterosexual 
and bisexual. However, Díaz-León’s critique of bidimensional dispositionalism is 
only successful if categories such as heterosexual and bisexual are orientation 
categories. Dembroff can reply to Díaz-León by holding that bidimensional dis-
positionalism captures the membership conditions of real orientation categories 
such as female-oriented and woman-oriented, notwithstanding its treatment of 
categories such as bisexual.
So, in order to advance the dialectic, we need to know the taxonomy of ori-
entation categories. However, as I demonstrate below, Dembroff and Díaz-León’s 
endorsement of the orientation-first view generates an impasse in their debate. 
By “impasse,” I refer to a dialectical situation in which (i) thinkers are rational 
to endorse their own arguments, (ii) which provide at least one thinker reason to 
deny premises in the argument of their interlocutor, and (iii) in which there is no 
mutually acceptable way to assess the truth or falsity of the disputed premise(s) 
in each argument.
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As I hope is clear from the discussion in the previous sub-section, both Dem-
broff and Díaz-León are rational to endorse their own arguments. So, their dia-
lectic has the first feature of an impasse. (Of course, lots of dialectics have this 
feature.)
Next, Dembroff’s endorsement of bidimensional dispositionalism provides 
them reason to deny the following premise in Díaz-León’s critique: heterosexual 
and bisexual are orientation categories. This is the case because bidimensional 
dispositionalism holds that sexual orientation is thinly-relational, such that indi-
viduals instantiate the property of sexual orientation in virtue of being attracted 
to individuals with certain features (irrespective of their own features). So, the 
dialectic has the second feature of an impasse.
Let us take stock. Díaz-León’s critique of bidimensional dispositionalism 
turns on the truth of the premise that heterosexual and bisexual are orientation 
categories, while Dembroff’s view requires its denial. (I will consider this point in 
more detail in Section 2.4.) In order to advance the dialectic, we need a mutually 
acceptable way to assess the premise.
Here is where Dembroff and Díaz-León’s endorsement of the orientation-
first view generates an impasse. Suppose that Dembroff were provided with an 
argument for a taxonomy that includes the category of homosexuality. Because 
Dembroff gives beliefs about the nature of orientation epistemic priority in rela-
tion to beliefs about the taxonomy of orientation categories, if an argument for 
a taxonomy fact has the result that orientation is not thinly-relational, that is 
reason for Dembroff to reject the argument. It is not reason for Dembroff to jet-
tison the belief that orientation is thinly-relational. Likewise, suppose that Díaz-
León were provided with an argument for a taxonomy that includes categories 
such as woman-orientated and female-orientated. On the orientation-first view, 
Díaz-León would have reason to reject the argument, as thinly-relational catego-
ries are incompatible with Díaz-León’s version of the desire view. In short, on 
the orientation-first view, it is not the case that arguments for taxonomy facts 
supersede the implications of theories about the nature of orientation. For this 
reason, the dialectic between Dembroff and Díaz-León has the third and final 
feature of an impasse.
2.3   The Taxonomy-First View can Resolve the Impasse
Above, I argued that the orientation-first view generates an impasse in the debate 
between Dembroff and Díaz-León. Here, I will explain how the impasse can be 
resolved with the taxonomy-first view.
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Recall that the taxonomy-first view holds that beliefs about the taxonomy of 
orientation categories have epistemic priority in relation to beliefs about the nature 
of sexual orientation. To clarify, the taxonomy-first view allows that an argument 
in favor of a particular taxonomy of orientation categories might rely on beliefs 
about the nature of sexual orientation. For example, in the present dialectical 
context, such an argument might rely on the belief – shared by Dembroff and Díaz-
León – that orientation is dispositional. That is, the taxonomy-first view does not 
require that we suspend judgment about the nature of orientation until we have 
settled on a taxonomy of orientation categories. Indeed, without any knowledge of 
the nature of orientation, it might not be possible to distinguish between plausible 
candidates for orientation categories (such as homosexual and female-oriented) 
and implausible candidates (such as man and Black). Instead, the taxonomy-first 
view holds that beliefs about the taxonomy of orientation categories ought to be 
preferred in the case of conflict with beliefs about the nature of sexual orientation.
With that in mind, let us again suppose that Dembroff were provided with 
an argument for a taxonomy that includes the category homosexual. On the 
taxonomy-first view, such an argument could provide Dembroff with reason to 
revise their belief that sexual orientation is thinly-relational. Likewise, suppose 
that Díaz-León were provided with an argument for a taxonomy that includes the 
categories woman-orientated and female-orientated. On the taxonomy-first view, 
such an argument could provide Díaz-León with reason to revise her belief that 
sexual orientation is thickly-relational. Accordingly, the taxonomy-first view has 
the potential to advance the dialectic between Dembroff and Díaz-León.17
2.4   Objection and Reply
Above, I held that Díaz-León’s critique of Dembroff’s bidimensional disposition-
alism turns on the truth of the claim that heterosexual and bisexual are orientation 
categories, while Dembroff’s account requires its denial. But here is an objection: 
Díaz-León’s critique of behavior-based accounts also applies to categories such as 
woman-oriented and female-oriented. That is – according to the objection – Díaz-
León’s argument more generally demonstrates that sexual orientation categories 
can not be analyzed as dispositions to behavior.
As outlined above, Díaz-León argues that behavior-based views are 
unintuitive with respect to the membership conditions of categories such as 
17 Of course, actually resolving the impasse will require developing a compelling argument in 
favor of a particular taxonomy of orientation categories. And that is a project for another paper.
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heterosexual and bisexual. Without an explanation of these unintuitive results, 
it seems that Díaz-León has demonstrated that behavior-based accounts can 
not capture the membership conditions of categories such as heterosexual and 
bisexual.18
Yet, I deny that Díaz-León’s critique demonstrates that behavior-based views 
are unintuitive with respect to the membership conditions of categories such as 
woman-oriented and man-oriented. To be clear, I think that Díaz-León compel-
lingly shows that Dembroff faces the following choice: either a wide range of 
possible worlds is relevant to orientation ascriptions, in which case both Alicia 
and Cary are woman-oriented and man-oriented, or a narrower range of possi-
ble worlds is relevant to orientation ascriptions, in which case Alicia is exclu-
sively man-oriented and Cary is exclusively woman-oriented. Still, Díaz-León’s 
argument only poses a challenge to Dembroff’s view if the above options are 
unintuitive with respect to the membership conditions of categories such as 
woman-oriented and man-oriented.
However, I deny that ascriptions of thinly-relational orientations can 
be assessed for intuitiveness in the same way as ascriptions of homosexual-
ity, heterosexuality, or bisexuality. On this point, note that Dembroff holds 
that categories such as man-oriented woman are not identical to categories 
such as heterosexual woman. In particular, Dembroff argues that the cat-
egories  heterosexual, homosexual, and bisexual are cisnormative; that is, 
 Dembroff argues that in order to be a member of the category heterosexual, an 
 individual must be a cisgender woman exclusively attracted to cisgender men, 
or a  cisgender man exclusively attracted to cisgender women. For Dembroff, 
this point applies to dominant as well as revisionary versions of the catego-
ries heterosexual, homosexual, and bisexual (Dembroff 2016, p. 5, 19, 24–25). 
Given that Dembroff ’s thinly-relational categories are not (yet?) socially 
18 Here, a strategy might be to argue that the membership conditions of categories such as 
 heterosexual and bisexual vary along the axis of gender. In defense of this claim, note that in 
many heteropatriarchal milieus, ascribing homosexuality to men is socially significant in ways 
that differ from the ascription of bisexuality to women. For example, bisexuality in women is 
often culturally coded as attractive, while homosexuality in men is stigmatized. This sociological 
fact might generate an asymmetry in the possible worlds that are relevant to ascribing bisexual-
ity to Alicia and heterosexuality to Cary. Still, an account in which the membership conditions 
of orientation categories differ along the axis of gender seems controversial, and – as far as I 
am aware – it remains undefended in the literature on the metaphysics of sexual orientation. 
Moreover, inasmuch as endorsing the view requires a sort of contextualism, it is unclear that the 
proposal could account for the intuition that Cary is heterosexual in milieus in which something 
closer to a “one-act rule” of homosexuality is socially operative.
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operative, I doubt that fine-grained judgments about the intuitiveness of their 
 membership conditions are warranted. Indeed, if certain membership con-
ditions seem  unintuitive, this might be on account of problematically inter-
preting  Dembroff ’s categories through the lens of extant thickly-relational 
categories.
Here is another way to put the point. Because Díaz-León holds that we ought 
to revise extant categories, her account must – to some extent – answer to the 
current membership conditions of categories such as homosexual and bisexual. 
But Dembroff’s new categories do not generate an analogous constraint. Accord-
ingly, I deny that Díaz-León’s critique of behavior-based theories of sexual orien-
tation applies to accounts which endorse categories such as woman-oriented and 
man-oriented.
3   An Argument from the Influence of Ideology
Above, I argued that we ought to endorse the taxonomy-first view of sexual 
orientation on account of its dialectical import, that is, its potential to resolve 
the impasse between Dembroff and Díaz-León. While I think that the dialecti-
cal upshot of the taxonomy-first view is evidence in its favor, it will be useful 
to supplement the aforementioned dialectical argument. Considering the influ-
ence of ideology on beliefs about race, I will argue that ideology tends to distort 
facts about the nature of race, while highlighting facts related to the taxonomy 
of race categories. By analogy, I will argue that this aspect of ideology provides 
reason to endorse the taxonomy-first view of sexual orientation. Additionally, 
I will briefly consider another argument for the taxonomy-first view of social 
properties in general.
To begin, I will explicate the phenomenon of ideology, broadly appealing to 
the work of Tommie Shelby. On Shelby’s account:
A form of social consciousness is an ideology if and only if (i) its discursive content is epis-
temically defective, that is, distorted by illusions; (ii) through these illusions it functions 
to establish or reinforce social relations of oppression; and (iii) its wide acceptance can 
be (largely) explained by the class-structured false consciousness of most who embrace it 
(Shelby 2003, p. 183–184).
Here, Shelby distinguishes between ideological and non-ideological “forms of 
social consciousness.” The idea is that any given society will – for purposes such 
as coordination and stabilization – foster a particular form of social conscious-
ness. Broadly, a form of social consciousness is a “coherent system of thought” of 
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significance to social practices.19 On Shelby’s view, an ideology is a normatively 
problematic form of social consciousness (Shelby 2003, p. 160).
For Shelby, (i) ideological forms of social consciousness are “epistemically 
defective.” On this point, Shelby considers beliefs involved in the racial profiling 
of Black individuals by police officers in the United States, claiming that “profil-
ing, by tapping into longstanding stereotypes, revives and reinforces ideological 
beliefs about the inherent tendency of Blacks towards violence and sexual aggres-
sion” (Shelby 2003, p. 176). While the above beliefs involved in racial profiling are 
false, Shelby notes that the epistemic defects of ideologies are often more subtle, 
involving “distorted, biased, or misleading representations of reality” (Shelby 
2003, p. 166). Shelby lists a variety of ways in which ideologies generate distor-
tions: “inconsistency, oversimplification, exaggeration, half-truth, equivocation, 
circularity, neglect of pertinent facts, false dichotomy, obfuscation, misuse of 
‘authoritative’ sources, hasty generalization, and so forth” (Shelby 2003, p. 166). 
Still, I think that this list is missing something. For example, as Shelby seems to 
note in a point about sensationalized reports of the racial distribution of crime 
rates, ideology can generate distortions by unduly highlighting certain facts. On 
this point, consider crime rates related to drug possession. Ideology generates a 
distortion by highlighting the fact that Black Americans are more often convicted 
of drug-related crimes than white Americans, while downplaying relevant contex-
tualizing information such as the racial distribution of police-initiated searches.20
Next, (ii) ideology plays a role in creating and sustaining oppression. As 
Shelby notes, there is an intimate connection between (i) and (ii):
[I]deologies perform their social operations by way of illusion and misrepresentation. What 
this means practically is that were the cognitive failings of an ideology to become widely 
recognized and acknowledged, the relations of domination and exploitation that it serves 
to reinforce would, other things being equal, subsequently become less stable and perhaps 
even amenable to reform (Shelby 2003, p. 174).
19 In particular, Shelby (2003) holds that forms of social consciousness are constituted by beliefs, 
such that: “(a) The beliefs are widely shared by members in the relevant group; and within the 
group, and sometimes outside it, the beliefs are generally known to be widely held. (b) The beliefs 
form, or are derived from, a prima facie coherent system of thought, which can be descriptive and/or 
normative. (c) The beliefs are a part of, or shape, the general outlook and self-conception of many in 
the relevant group. (d) The beliefs have a significant impact on social action and social institutions.”
20 For example, according to data from 2012 to 2014, in Ferguson, Missouri, “African Americans 
are more than twice as likely as white drivers to be searched during vehicle stops even after 
controlling for non-race based variables such as the reason the vehicle stop was initiated, but 
are found in possession of contraband 26% less often than white drivers, suggesting officers are 
impermissibly considering race as a factor when determining whether to search” (United States 
Department of Justice 2015).
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The connection between ideological distortion and oppression is evident in 
the above example of racial profiling, as ideological representations of the char-
acter of Black individuals, in part, explain racial disparities in assessments of 
“suspiciousness.” To be clear, Shelby denies that eliminating racist ideologies 
would automatically abolish the practice of racial profiling; still, ideological rep-
resentations are part of the problem (Shelby 2003, p. 187).
Next, Shelby holds (iii) that there is often an error-theoretic explanation for 
why individuals hold ideological beliefs. In particular, the following social struc-
tural explanation is often apt: ideological beliefs sustain unjust social practices 
(Shelby 2003, p. 170–172, 183, 188).21 In case that sounds a bit conspiratorial, 
consider the following, pervasive case: a police officer unjustly attacks a Black 
individual, yet members of the public falsely believe – say, even with unambigu-
ous video record of the disproportionate violence – that the officer was properly 
responding to an objective threat. Why would otherwise epistemically responsible 
individuals hold such unjustifiable beliefs? I think that there is a social structural 
explanation: the false belief sustains the unjust social practice of racial profiling, 
stabilizing and perpetuating oppressive, white supremacist social orders.
Here, ideology tends to frustrate the apprehension of facts about the nature 
of race, while highlighting facts related to the taxonomy of race categories. As 
noted above, ideology (i) falsely represents the character traits of Black individu-
als, which (ii) plays a role in sustaining the oppressive practice of racial profiling. 
In particular, ideology represents Black individuals as “parasitic, angry, ungrate-
ful, and dangerous” (Shelby 2003, p. 161). This involves a false representation 
about the nature of race, viz., that race is predictive of character. Still, this is not 
quite enough for ideology to “work” in the case of racial profiling. Ideology must 
also highlight the fact that Black is a race category.22 And while it is true that Black 
is a race category, highlighting this taxonomy fact in concert with the false repre-
sentation that race is predictive of character results in a distorted representation 
that sustains the practice of racial profiling.
21 Note that Shelby does not quite put the point in these structuralist terms, focusing instead of 
how ideological beliefs function to reconcile individuals to their social positions. For discussion 
of social structuralist explanations, see esp. Haslanger (2016).
22 Here, my argument relies on the claim that Black, as opposed to African, is a race category. 
In this way, I reject Spencer’s taxonomy of race categories. While this is a cost of the argument 
advanced here, I hope that it is somewhat mitigated by the fact that naturalistic accounts of race 
– including sophisticated versions of naturalism, such as Spencer’s – are quite controversial. 
Additionally, note that it is not necessary to endorse the taxonomy-first view of race in order to 
hold that Black is a race category. For example, Chike Jeffers’ (2013) cultural theory of race seems 
agnostic with respect to the taxonomy-first view.
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As noted above, (iii) there are often error-theoretic explanations for why 
individuals hold ideological beliefs. In the context of ideological representations 
that sustain the practice of racial profiling, this amounts to the following: on 
account of ideology, social agents are disposed to hold the false belief that race 
is predictive of character and the true belief that Black is a race category, which, 
in concert, produce a distorted representation that sustains the practice of racial 
profiling. In this way, social agents are disposed to hold a false belief about the 
nature of race in concert with a true belief about the taxonomy of race categories. 
Taking seriously the influence of ideology on the race-related beliefs of social 
agents, the above discussion provides reason to endorse the taxonomy-first view 
of race.
By analogy, I think that the influence of ideology also provides reason to 
endorse the taxonomy-first view of sexual orientation. On this point, perhaps it 
is enough simply to note that I do not see any relevant dissimilarities between 
ideological distortion in the case of racial oppression and ideological distortion 
in the case of sexuality-based oppression.
However, in case such an analogy is suspect, I will wrap-up this section 
by advancing an argument for the taxonomy-first view of social properties in 
general. The following argument is intended as a sketch. Here, I do not aim to 
provide a comprehensive defense of the taxonomy-first view of social proper-
ties in general. Still, the following supplementary remarks might shore up the 
analogy between the epistemology of race and sexual orientation properties. 
To begin, note that it is plausible that social properties are partly created by 
representations. For example, Ron Mallon holds that a social category exists 
just in case:
1. Representation: there is a term, label, or mental representation that picks 
out a category of persons C, and that representation is associated with – and 
figures in the expression of – a set of beliefs and evaluations – or a concep-
tion – of the persons so picked out.
2. Social conditions: many or all of the beliefs and evaluations in the con-
ception of the role are common knowledge in the community (Mallon 
2016, p. 58).
The former condition speaks to the contents of representations associated with a 
particular social category, while the latter explicates the conditions under which 
such representations manage to create a social category.
Now, in some cases, members of a social category come to have features 
that correspond to common knowledge representations, especially as related 
to representations involving category-typical features. This is the familiar 
causal “looping effect” involved in much social construction (Mallon 2016, p. 
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82). For example, members of the category queer are represented as typically 
gender deviant, which plausibly, in part explains why queer individuals break 
from mainstream gender norms more often than straight individuals. Yet, this 
sort of causal looping is not a necessary effect of representations involving 
category-typical features. This is obvious by considering the aforementioned 
ideological representations of members of the category Black. In short, the fact 
that there are common knowledge representations involving category-typical 
features might provide probabilistic evidence that members of the represented 
category in fact exhibit such features (Mallon 2016, p. 89–93). Yet, if there are 
common knowledge representations involving category-typical features, then 
the represented category exists. Or, at least, this is the case on Mallon’s above 
account.
Here, I would like to suggest that there is an intimate link between the epis-
temology of social properties and the representational aspect of their creation. 
If Mallon is correct that common knowledge representations create social cat-
egories, then it is unlikely that social agents will generally be mistaken about 
the existence of the categories that they represent. This is the case even if social 
agents are profoundly confused about the constructed status of represented cat-
egories, or the features in fact exhibited by category members. Here is reason in 
favor of the taxonomy-first view of social properties. As Dembroff and Díaz-León 
agree that sexual orientation is amenable to ameliorative revision, it is plausible 
that Dembroff and Díaz-León also agree that sexual orientation is a social prop-
erty. In that case, the above argument provides reason to endorse the taxonomy-
first view of sexual orientation.
4   Conclusion
Above, I provided an argument in favor of the taxonomy-first view of sexual orien-
tation. That is, I argued that beliefs about the taxonomy of orientation categories 
ought to have epistemic priority in relation to beliefs about the nature of sexual 
orientation. Here is opportunity for future research. Without appeal to disputed 
facts about the nature of sexual orientation, we can work to explicate the tax-
onomy of sexual orientation categories.
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